



Aggregate statistics readily indicate why so many observers of
financial markets in the United States are concerned about the balance
between debt and equity in the corporate financial decision. Exceeding
zero in most years before 1984, net equity issues by U.S. nonfinancial
corporations have been negative in each year since. Net redemptions
averaged approximately $80 billion annually during the period 1984-87,
and then rose in 1988 to $131 billion. Over the same period, net new
borrowing by the nonfinancial corporate sector rose sharply, with
outstanding credit market debt growing annually by nearly $170 billion
during 1984-87 and by $189 billion in 1988 (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 1989).
Debt-equity ratios can be calculated in many ways, however, and
not every measure provides such a sharp picture of recent events. The
change in the value of corporate equity over any period equals net
equity issues plus changes in the value of existing equity. Because of the
strong performance of the stock market during the 1980s, the ratio of the
stock of debt to the stock of equity, measured at market value, began
rising only in 1987, the year of the stock market crash.
Although little consensus exists about how debt-equity ratios
should be measured to evaluate recent events, the continuing strength
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of corporate borrowing, combined with the historically unusual magni-
tude of equity redemptions, has led to many theories seeking to explain
the new behavior and has evoked calls for tax reform by those attribut-
ing the borrowing to flaws in the tax system. This paper considers the
theory and evidence relating tax factors to the recent borrowing surge,
concluding that changes in tax incentives are not the primary cause of
the shift toward debt and that the social costs of increased borrowing
may have been overstated.. It then reviews a variety of alternative tax
reform proposals that have been made over the years to reduce the
disparities in the tax treatment of debt and equity. Given the tenuous
link between recent borrowing and the tax environment as well as
the uncertainty about the social costs of such borrowing, the benefits
of these proposals should be clearly established before adoption is con-
sidered. Most proposals either would provide significant windfalls at
great tax revenue cost or would introduce new distortions to financial
behavior.
Taxes and Leverage
The United States has a "classical" corporate income tax, treating
corporations and their shareholders as separate entities. The result is the
"double taxation" of corporate equity income, with firms paying the
corporate tax and shareholders being taxed on dividends and capital
gains. With interest a deductible expense, cash flow used to meet
corporate interest payments is taxed only once, to the recipient. The
distinction of the tax treatment of the corporation from that of an
unincorporated business, such as a partnership, is therefore in the
treatment of equity, and many reform proposals have been aimed at
changing the tax treatment of equity earnings.
Perhaps the easiest way to express the corporate imbalance between
debt and equity is in terms of the after-tax return an investor receives per
dollar of corporate source income. For equity, the return is (1-to)(1 -te),
where tc is the corporate tax rate and te is the investor’s tax rate on equity
earnings. For debt, the return is (1--tb), where tb is the investor’s tax rate
on interest income.
For a single investor facing equal tax rates on debt and equity
income (tb = re), debt is clearly the security of choice. Yet, even after the
events of recent years, equity remains the dominant form of holding
corporate wealth in the United States, and many theories have at-
tempted to explain why.138 Alan J. Auerbach
Taxpayer Clienteles
Two other key features of the income tax are progressivity in the
marginal rate structure and a tax advantage for equity at the individual
level afforded by the deferral and potentially favorable taxation of capital
gains. This causes high-bracket investors to have a tax preference for
equity relative to low-bracket investors, and, if the individual tax
advantage of equity is high enough, may also cause high-bracket
investors to have an absolute tax preference for equity: their tax rate on
equity income, te, may be far enough below their tax rate on interest
income, tb, that it outweighs the extra burden of the corporate tax.
This sorting of investors by tax rates has been discussed in many
contexts in the literature, and is often associated in this particular case
with the contribution by Miller (1977). From the perspective of absolute
tax preference, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 seems a likely suspect as the
source of the recent growth in corporate indebtedness.
As of 1986, the top individual federal tax rate on interest income, tb,
was 50 percent, while the corporate tax rate was 46 percent. Thus, the
smart investor who held low-yield stocks and died before realizing
capital gains (and hence paid no taxes on them) might actually have
faced a lighter total tax burden by holding equity, even with the
corporate tax. After the 1986 act, this is no longer possible. The
corporate rate, 34 percent, now exceeds the highest marginal tax rate on
interest income, 33 percent. Moreover, the maximum tax rate on capital
gains has risen from 20 percent to 33 percent, pushing attainment of the
"Miller equilibrium" even farther from feasibility. The argument may be
put simply: before 1986 there were investors with an absolute tax
preference for equity; now there are none. Hence debt has been
encouraged.
Diversification and the "Marginal" Investor
A serious problem with this argument is that it presumes that
equity is held only by those with an absolute tax preference for it. Yet
even zero-bracket investors such as pension funds hold considerable
equity in their portfolios. For example, at the end of 1987, private
pension funds in the United States held $486.8 billion in corporate
equities (including mutual funds) and only $356.2 billion in credit
market debt (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1988a).
Clearly, an element of diversification is involved in investor decisions
between debt and equity, and this makes every investor a "marginal"
investor in the sense that the overall demand for debt versus equity is
affected by the tax treatment of each investor currently buying both
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Once one recognizes this, the impact of the 1986 tax act becomes far
less clear. For some equity investors, such as pension funds, the
corporate tax rate is the only tax rate that matters, and the reduction in
this tax rate has made equity more attractive. The highest-income
investors, who enjoyed a reduction in their marginal tax rate from 50
percent to 28 percent while suffering an increase from 20 percent to 28
percent in the rate of capital gains tax, were almost certainly given a
greater incentive to hold debt. Middle-income individuals now in the 33
percent bracket experienced a much lower reduction in their marginal
tax rates (which previously had been well below 50 percent), and it is not
clear that for them the tax act exerted a strong push toward either equity
or debt. Thus, whether the 1986 act encouraged or discouraged borrow-
ing depends on how the demands of each investor group changed. If
one looks simply at changes in average marginal tax rates on returns to
debt and equity, the calculation suggests that the act actually favored
equity.I
In a sense, this complication is fortunate if one is attempting to
demonstrate that corporate borrowing is tax-driven, since the real break
in behavior appears to have ’occurred in 1984, well before any prudent
investor would have viewed a tax reform such as the one that occurred
in 1986 as a likely event. A more likely culprit is the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, which lowered individual tax rates without lowering the
corporate tax rate. That borrowing did not explode immediately after
1981 could very well be attributable to the serious recession that
immediately followed.
Tax Losses and the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate
Not all changes in the marginal corporate tax rate occur through
legislation. Firms that incur net operating losses have a current marginal
tax rate of zero unless they can offset these losses against income in the
previous three years to obtain a tax refund. Otherwise, they must carry
the losses forward until sufficient income is earned to be offset by them,
or until the losses expire after fifteen years.
While firms carrying losses forward may ultimately use them to
shelter gains, the present value of such tax benefits is well below their
face value, due to their potential expiration and the fact that they carry
over without interest. Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) estimated that the
present value of a dollar of tax losses carried forward by a representative
corporation in the early 1980s was between forty and fifty cents. Since
additional interest deductions simply add to the tax loss carryforward
For further discussion, see Auerbach (1987). Also see Poterba (1987).140 Alan J. Auerbach
for a firm not currently paying taxes, the value of such deductions for
such a firm may be less than half that indicated by the statutory
corporate rate: a dollar of deductions may be worth only 17 cents or less,
rather than 34 cents. Indeed, since interest deductions on new borrow-
ing are received in the future, this reduction in their value applies to all
firms except those certain never to incur tax losses.
The correction for the asymmetry of the tax system provides an
additional rationale for the coexistence of debt and equity. For example,
Altshuler and Auerbach estimated an average effective tax rate for
interest deductions of approximately 32 percent during the early 1980s,
when the statutory corporate tax rate was 46 percent. Cutting the
effective corporate tax rate by nearly a third could reestablish an absolute
tax preference for equity among high-bracket investors, even under
current law.
The changing frequency of tax losses over time should also influ-
ence borrowing trends, since firms with tax losses have a weaker tax
incentive to borrow. Panel and cross-section studies give some evidence
that firm indebtedness does respond as predicted to high tax losses
(Auerbach 1985; Givoly et alo 1989). But the aggregate pattern of tax
losses in recent years does not offer any reason for borrowing to have
increased.
Table I provides a breakdown of nonfinancial firms by tax status for
the period 1969-88, based on a sample of firms taken from the COM-
PUSTAT Industrial and Industrial Research Files. The sample includes
all firms for which a tax loss carryforward (zero or otherwise) was
reported.2 As is clear from the table, the fraction of firms reporting tax
losses has risen sharply during the 1980s, falling only slightly in 1988
from its peak in 1987. One might argue that increased borrowing has led
2 The nonreporting rate varies over time, and is correlated with the fraction of firms
reporting tax losses in the same year. This suggests that an unreported value may indicate
the presence of a tax loss carryforward that is not of "material significance" from an
accounting standpoint.
It should also be noted that the "accounting" tax loss carryforwards reported on
COMPUSTAT differ in some cases from the true tax loss carryforwards. However, there is
no machine-readable source of the correct measures. Even if one is willing to examine the
financial statements of individual firms, the problem of missing data is much more severe
for the true tax loss carryforward measure, leading to a substantial underreporting in the
aggregate (Auerbach and Poterba 1987).
The fractions reported in Table 1 follow the same pattern through 1982 as those given
by Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) based on actual corporate tax returns but, even if
missing values are included, also appear to underrepresent the fraction of firms actually
having tax loss carryforwards. To evaluate the pattern of tax losses over time rather than
their exact level, however, the accounting measure seems adequate. The same general
pattern was found for samples of firms drawn only from the Industrial File (that is, those
that had not disappeared before 1988) and those with complete data for the entire period
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Table 1
Tax Loss Carryforwards in the United States
Percentage of Nonfinancial Firms Reporting:
Carryforward
Year Carryforward = 0 Carryforward > 0 Not Reported
1969 95.5 3.2 1.2
1970 96.7 2.6 .7
1971 95.5 3.6 1,0
1972 96.0 3.7 .3
1973 95.8 3.2 1.0
1974 94.7 3.9 1.5
1975 95.9 3.0 1.2
1976 94.4 4.1 1,5
1977 93.8 4.3 1,9
1978 93.3 5.1 1.6
1979 91.6 5.3 3.1
1980 91.0 5.6 3,3
1981 91.6 6.0 2,4
1982 89.7 6.4 3.9
1983 88.2 7.4 4.4
1984 86.7 8.4 4.9
1985 83.9 11,1 5.0
1986 82.2 11.8 6.0
1987 81.5 11.9 6.6
1988 83.8 10.5 5.7
Notes: Sample includes all nonfinancial firms on COMPUSTAT Industrial and Industrial Research Files
having data on debt and equity values.
Percentages are weighted by firm values (debt plus equity).
to this outcome, but then a reduction in the incidence of tax loss carry-
forwards could not have been a causal factor itself. If it has played a role
at all, the asymmetry of the tax system has mitigated the urge to borrow.
Untrapping the "’Trapped Equity"?
The recent increase in equity retirements raises an important and
controversial issue regarding the impact of taxation on corporate finan-
cial policy. A particularly puzzling aspect of corporate behavior over the
years has been the decision of firms to pay dividends to shareholders
subject to ordinary income taxes when an apparently dominant form of
distribution, the repurchase of a firm’s own shares, has been available.
Since shareholders pay capital gains taxes on such redemptions, such
transactions traditionally have had two tax advantages. First, capital
gains were taxed at a lower rate. This advantage disappeared (perhaps142 Alan J. Auerbach
temporarily) in 1986. However, a second advantage remains, the ability
to deduct the basis of shares redeemed in calculating one’s tax liability.
Since redemptions are essentially equivalent to dividends in other
respects, it is difficult to use standard arguments (for example, signal-
ling) to rationalize the choice of dividends over repurchases by firms.3
Given that dividends exist, some controversy remains over the
extent to which they influence the cost of equity capital. While the
traditional approach has been to estimate the effective tax rate on equity
earnings as a weighted average of tax rates on dividends and capital
gains based on payout ratios, this is inappropriate to the extent that
marginal equity funds are generated internally. Since the retention of
earnings relieves shareholders of the need to pay taxes on dividends,
this lowers the cost of equity capital, making the effective capital gains
tax rate the correct measure of the individual tax burden on all returns
to equity and the dividend tax rate irrelevant in computing the cost of
funds (Auerbach 1979; Bradford 1981; King 1977). A corollary of this
view is that taxes on distributions in excess of the effective capital gains
tax rate are unavoidable and hence capitalized into the value of corpo-
rate shares. Note that the effective capital gains tax rate in this context
takes into account the deferral advantage and possibility of avoidance at
death that taxpayers with capital gains tax liabilities enjoy.
While a dispute continues about whether this "new" view or the
traditional one is correct (Auerbach 1983; Poterba and Summers 1985),
neither provides an explanation for the existence of dividends. In effect,
the theories differ with respect to whether new equity funds are seen to
come from a reduction in current distributions or an increase in the sale
of new shares, but neither offers a prediction of the form of the
distributions a firm makes. Each theory would be entirely consistent
with firms minimizing the taxes actually paid by shareholders on the
distributions. Thus, the explosion of share redemptions in recent years
tells us little about which theory is "correct." However, this "discovery"
of share repurchases has different implications for the cost of capital
under the two hypotheses. For the traditional view that prescribes a
weighted-average approach to measuring the tax rate on equity, there
would be a reduction in the marginal equity tax burden. Under the
alternative view, that taxes on distributions do not exert a marginal
effect, the discovery would simply raise share prices.4
Have corporations really learned to avoid the dividend tax? If so,
3 For one attempt in this direction, see Bernheim (1988).
4 The tax reduction would also be likely to raise share prices under the traditional
approach, since distributions from existing assets would be taxed at a lower rate and
investment would be encouraged by the lower marginal tax rate. However, this increase
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Table 2
Disposition of Earnings and Sources of Funds, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporations
Billions of Dollars
(1)     (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Earnings-Dividends-Redemptions=Retentions+Equity + Net = Funds
Issues Borrowing Raised
1980 89.8 61,0 8,2 20.6 21.1 57,8 99.5
1981 108.3 67.6 33.0 7.7 21.5 102.1 131.3
1982 92.9 72,0 22.5 -1,6 -28.9 43.4 70.7
1983 135,5 78.0 16.5 41.0 40.0 54.4 135.4
1984 178.9 81,0 92.5 5.4 18.0 170.3 193.7
1985 185.3 84.0 106,5 -5,2 25.0 132.4 152.2
1986 184,8 89.9 118.6 -23.7 37.8 173.8 187.9
1987 173.6 95,5 112.0 -33,9 35.5 136.8 138.4
1988 181.6 103.3
Source: Columns 1 and 2: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1988b).
Earnings are worldwide, after-tax, adjusted for capital consumption allowances and investment valuation
adjustments.
Data for 1988 come from unpublished Board of Governors data.
Columns 3, 5, and 6: Joint Committee on Taxation (1989).
Redemptions include retirement of shares of acquired firms.
one would expect them to have replaced dividends with share repur-
chases. Evidence of this is not immediately evident, at least in the
aggregate. The increase in net share redemptions has come about
through an increase in gross retirements rather than a decrease in gross
new issues, and the fraction of distributions accounted for by these
redemptions has certainly risen in recent years. However, no decline in
dividends has occurred, and a significant fraction of the redemptions
have been associated with takeovers rather than self-tenders.
Table 2 presents changes in the sources and uses of funds in the
U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector from 1980 through 1987. Given the
cash-flow identity of each firm and hence the corporate sector as a
whole, the increase in net redemptions must have been associated with
an increase in profits (net of taxes and interest payments), a decrease in
dividends, an increase in borrowing, a decrease in funds available for
investment, or some combination of these events (all measured relative
to trend). Dividends have grown quite smoothly over the period, while
there has been no obvious trend in investment. Clearly, a sharp
correlation exists between borrowing and redemptions.
Even though dividends have continued to grow, this does not
prove that repurchases have not slowed their growth. To obtain a more
precise estimate of the extent to which firms may have used repurchases
to substitute for dividends, we use a typical model of aggregate144 Alan ]. Auerbach
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aEstimated using a dynamic simulation based on equation(1)inthetext.
dividend policy,5 estimated over the sample period 1947-83 (1983 being
the last year before the explosion of repurchases), to predict dividends
for the years 1984--88. If the model overpredicts aggregate dividends,
this result will indicate that firms have replaced them with repurchases.
The estimated equation is:
A log(DIV) = .14 + .03 Alog(Y) + .06 log(Y-l) +       (1)
(1.62) (1.20)       (2.36)
.09 A log(T) + .43 log (T_I) - .15 log (DIV_~)
(0.26) (1.37) (-2.41)
R2, = .243
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.95
(t-statistics are in parentheses)
where DIV and Y are nonfinancial corporate dividends and earnings (as
given in Table 2) divided by the GNP deflator and T is one minus the tax
rate on dividends, taken from Poterba (1987, Table 4). Dynamic simu-
lations based on equation (1), beginning in 1984, yield the predicted
dividends given in Table 3. The results suggest that even though
dividends have grown during the last five years, they would have
grown more quickly had previous behavior been followed. In 1987, for
example, dividends were $15.9 billion less than predicted. If one
attributes this change entirely to the substitution of share repurchases
for dividends, then approximately 30 percent of the $52.6 billion of share
repurchases (Bagwell and Shoven 1989) that occurred in 1987 replaced
s The equation is essentially the one estimated by Poterba (1987, Table 5, column 2).
The coefficients are somewhat different, owing to differences in sample periods and data
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dividends. Thus, while substitution for dividends may have been
significant, it is not the major explanation for the rise in the level of share
repurchases. 6
Moreover, an even greater amount of equity than was repurchased
by firms themselves disappeared through cash-financed takeovers, with
the total value of shares redeemed through both channels equaling $112
billion in 1987. One can therefore explain only a small percentage of total
equity retirements as having occurred in lieu of concurrent dividends.
While it is not clear what fraction of acquisitions were associated with
additional borrowing, a significant fraction of the total equity retired
through acquisitions, $46.4 billion, came through leveraged buyouts,7
which have had initial debt-value ratios close to one.
Thus, the pattern of equity retirements appears to be much more
one of borrowing to finance takeovers and, to a lesser extent, to
repurchase one’s own shares rather than one of altering the nature of
distributions to shareholders. It is perhaps more accurate to characterize
it as a shift from equity to debt through the redemption of shares rather
than a change in the form of corporate distributions. It is therefore
unclear whether the mix of prospective distributions and the associated
taxes thereon has changed. If firms will continue to rely on dividends for
distributions, little has changed. All of this must be said with a fair
degree of uncertainty, for we still understand very poorly what drives
firms to pay dividends.
Takeovers and Leverage
The preceding empirical evidence suggests that much of the recent
shift from equity to debt in the U.S. corporate sector has been associated
with takeover activity, including leveraged buyouts. Indeed, to the
extent that managers of potential targets have felt compelled to borrow
as a defensive measure, to avoid being taken over, much of the
6 Additional evidence from data on individual firms suggests that the high level of
share redemptions in recent years has not been primarily a phenomenon of dividend
replacement. A sample with complete data for the period 1969-88 was used for the
investigation. This sample accounted for over half the dividends of all nonfinancial
corporations during the 1980s, and so should be fairly representative.
Before the period 1984-88, repurchases were small in aggregate size and did appear to
be used in place of dividends. For the period 1979-83, only 30 percent of the firms in the
sample (weighted by firm value) repurchased at least 0.5 percent of their equity in at least
one of the five years. For fl~e repurchasing subset of firms, however, total repurchases
exceeded total dividends in each of the five years. During the next five-year period,
1984-88, repurchasing became much more widespread, with only 21 percent failing to
repurchase at least 0.5 percent of shares in at least one year. However, for this group,
dividends exceeded repurchases in every year of the period.
7 U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation (1989, page 11).146 Alan J. Auerbach
borrowing not directly associated with acquisitions may also be attrib-
utable to the increase in takeover activity.
Many observers have viewed the tax advantages of borrowing as an
incentive to engage in takeovers. However, this argument has its
problems. Foremost among them is that firms can gain the tax advan-
tages of borrowing by purchasing their own shares rather than the
shares of another company.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 contained various provisions aimed at
curtailing some of the other tax benefits associated with corporate
takeovers.8 It is possible that this change contributed to an increase in
firms borrowing to repurchase their own shares (leveraged buyouts are
essentially in this category, from a tax perspective) as a substitute for
more traditional debt-financed acquisitions of one corporation by an-
other, but it does not explain why debt-financed equity retirements as a
whole should have increased in the past couple of years.
Debt, New Equity and Old Equity
Much of the discussion of debt versus equity has ignored the
different choices facing new or expanding companies and those with a
sufficient base of existing equity. Since all evidence suggests that the rise
in corporate indebtedness has come about through increased borrowing
by existing companies, it is important that any analysis of the subject
apply to the replacement of existing equity with debt rather than
borrowing in lieu of issuing new equity.
This distinction is essentially the one made above between the
"’new" and "traditional" views of the burden of dividend taxation (and,
more generally, any taxes on cash distributions). While a single tax (that
of the bondholders) is levied on newly issued debt, two levels of
taxation (on corporate income and distributions) are levied on newly
issued equity. Firms borrowing to replace equity avoid the double
taxation of future equity income, but must "prepay" the shareholder-
level tax immediately when the funds are distributed. It is not of obvious
relevance whether current distributions of equity take the form of
repurchases, since they could have done so in the future had the equity
not been redeemed. Thus, the recent ascendancy of share repurchases
and their favorable tax treatment cannot in themselves explain why
firms would wish to substitute debt for existing equity, unless this
preferred method of disbursing equity funds is perceived to be temporary
(as would be the case if a crackdown on repurchasing activity were
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anticipated). Otherwise, one can view an increase in the ability to repur-
chase simply as a permanent reduction in the rate of tax on distributions.
Just as firms face a smaller marginal tax rate on investment of
retentions than on investment financed by issuing new shares, they
have a smaller incentive to replace existing equity with debt than to
borrow instead of issuing new equity. In each case, it is the avoidance of
taxes on current distributions that favors the use of existing equity over
new equity. This distinction is of particular relevance when one consid-
ers the effects of proposals for the reform of the corporate tax, since they
differ markedly in their recognition of it.
Summary
The recent increase in borrowing by nonfinancial corporations is
difficult to attribute to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. While the overall tax
incentives for some equity investors to hold debt increased, the incen-
tives for other significant equity investors to purchase debt declined.
The growth of corporate equity retirements is clearly related to the
increase in borrowing, but the tax advantage of redemption over
dividends cannot in itself explain the shift toward debt. Another
potentially important tax factor, the reduction in the value of interest
deductions associated with limitations on the deductibility of net oper-
ating losses, points in the opposite direction.
If tax changes have not induced the change in borrowing, however,
the underlying imbalances always present in the tax system may have
contributed to it. In this sense, the borrowing could be tax-related even
if it is not tax-induced, and the need to reduce the remaining imbalance
between debt and existing equity might have increased even if the
imbalance itself has not.
This distinction requires an understanding of the nontax factors
affecting borrowing. If borrowing to retire equity has even a small tax
advantage, other, nontax costs must prevent equity from disappearing
entirely. These costs might include increased bankruptcy risk, distorted
choice of investments and, potentially, an inefficiently short planning
horizon.9 If these nontax costs have not declined, an increase in borrowing
would represent an increase in the overall social cost of financial distor-
tions. On the other hand, a reduction in any of these costs, as through
increasing efficiency in financial markets or a more competitive market for
corporate control, could have led firms to take greater advantage of
9 No consensus exists that forcing a decline in horizons and, more generalIy, putting
managers "under the gun" would reduce efficiency. Some, for example Jensen (1989), see
this as a major benefit of additional borrowing.148 Alan J. Auerbach
whatever tax advantage to borrowing already existed. In this case, the total
social costs of tax-driven borrowing would not necessarily have increased.
While more of the distortionary activity, borrowing, would be occurring,
the financial innovations would have made the activity itself less distor-
tionary. In the extreme case that all real distinctions between debt and
equity cease to exist, firms would be led to replace all equity with debt to
the extent that any tax advantage at all were available, but the distortion of
financial behavior would be entirely absent. 10
Tax reform may be important even if recent tax changes are not at
fault. The case is weakened, however, if the borrowing has resulted
from real (as opposed to perceived) reductions in the distinction
between debt and equity.
The Gains from Reforming the Corporate Tax
Arguments favoring reform of the corporate tax take two forms.
Some are based on welfare arguments concerning the economic distor-
tions of increased corporate borrowing, while others stress the revenue
loss to the government if tax-advantaged debt supplants equity. Though
evaluating the significance of the economic distortions of borrowing is
beyond the scope of this paper, one should be cognizant that, as
stressed above, increased borrowing may be due in part to a reduction
in such distortions. In addition, the importance of the revenue-loss
argument may well have been overstated.
First of all, if debt is tax-favored and firms use more of it, the
ensuing revenue losses will be associated with reductions in the mar-
ginal corporate tax burden and the corporate cost of capital in the United
States. Although reducing the marginal tax burden on new corporate
investment would not necessarily increase social welfare, neither is it
obviously a destructive policy. Many analysts have viewed with envy
the high debt-equity ratios in Japan, interpreting them as a partial
explanation for the lower cost of capital there (for example, Hatsopoulos
1983). Second, the estimated losses of revenue from increased indebt-
edness may be overestimated.
Several factors contribute to such overestimates. Some observers
simply ignore the taxes paid by recipients of interest payments on the
newly created debt. A more subtle point is that replacements of equity
with debt cause a speeding-up of the payment of capital gains taxes on
These changes, and their welfare implications, are discussed in more detail in
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retired shares. 11 In addition, although it is customary to apply average
marginal tax rates on existing interest receipts to estimate the taxes paid
on additional interest, such an assumption has little justification.
For purposes of illustration, consider a model in which each firm
issues risky equity and riskless debt, with the underlying before-tax
returns to the firm unaffected by its financial structure. Investors choose
portfolios of debt and equity based on both tax preferences and the
motive for diversification. This means that all investors will hold some
equity, even those with a strong tax preference for debt, in order to bear
some risk and achieve the risk premium that comes with doing so. Now,
suppose each firm replaces a fixed fraction of its equity with debt,
repurchasing the shares from its shareholders. The mean cash flow
passing to owners of equity will decline and the variance of this cash
flow will be unaffected, so that the value of equity will fall and the
riskiness of its rate of return will increase. Who will hold the additional
debt? Consider the following logic32
If existing equity owners simply use the sale proceeds to buy the
new debt, they will essentially undo the changes in financial structure
generated by the firms, following the standard Modigliani-Miller home-
made leverage approach. Investors will hold the same claims to each
firm as before, but packaged in different ways. Absent taxes, this would
result in the initial equilibrium and no further adjustments would occur.
In the presence of taxes, however, a new equilibrium will result.
The shift in each firm’s financial structure toward more risky equity
will make equity investment in general more attractive to those low-
bracket taxpayers with a relative tax preference for debt, since they may
now assume a given amount of risk while committing less wealth to the
asset, equity, that they would prefer to avoid for tax reasons. Hence, we
would expect to observe further shifts toward equity by lower-bracket
taxpayers, with more of the debt being purchased by higher-bracket
taxpayers. The resulting distribution of purchasers of the new debt will
therefore have a higher average marginal tax rate than the distribution of
initial equity owners. Note that this argument is not based on any
assumption about the initial distribution of equity ownership or the level
of risk aversion of any class of investors; nor does it depend in any way
on the identity of investors directly purchasing the newly issued bonds.
Given the different distributions of debt and equity holdings, this
1~ See Jensen, Kaplan and Stiglin (1989). These authors also include tax revenue
coming from increased operating efficiency in their calculations, but these do not derive
directly from the transaction replacing equity with debt.
~2 The following arguments may be demonstrated rigorously using the model pre-
sented in Auerbach and King (1983), assuming that each investor is at an interior portfolio
optimum both before and after the change in financial policy.150 Alan J. Auerbach
Table 4




Group Tax Rate of Equity of Debt
Households 21.7 (Debt) 54.2 7.6
25,3 (Equity)
Tax-Exempt Organizations 0 11.1 4.4
Foreigners 0 6.1 13.3
Banks and Thrifts 14.9 .2 10.4
Insurance Companies 20.0 5.4 37.6
Private and Public Pension Funds 0 22.6 25,0
Brokers and Dealers 34,0 .4 1.6
Addendum: Average Marginal Tax Rate 15.0 11.2
Sources: Ownership percentages (for 1987): Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1988a).
Mutual fund holdings of debt and equity distributed among groups. Tax-exempts separated from
household sector according to percentages given in U,S. Joint Committee on Taxation (1989),
Tax rates (for 1988): households, Hausman and Poterba (1987); other sectors, Summers (1989).
weighting schemeleads to a higher estimate of the average marginal tax
rate on new interest receipts. An estimate of this difference is provided
in Table 4, showing the average marginal tax rates on interest receipts
based on ownership of debt and equity. Moreover, it should be kept in
mind that not all additional interest deductions will be taken at the 34
percent corporate tax rate. The net gap between effective corporate and
bondholder tax rates could well be as little as 10 percentage points, given
the current incidence of tax losses among firms.
Proposals to Reform the Taxation of Corporate Cash
Flows
One can distinguish two broad classes of proposals aimed at dealing
with imbalances between debt and equity.~3 Some would attempt to
restrict particular forms of borrowing associated with perceived abuses
and "loopholes," while others would be aimed at a more general
rationalization of the tax treatment of debt and equity.
Despite their continuing popularity, specific interest limitations are
difficult to justify as an appropriate policy tool, except in cases where
better-suited approaches are politically impractical or otherwise not
13 The analysis of this section draws heavily on Auerbach (1989), which discusses the
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possible. From a theoretical perspective, few situations exist in which
one would wish to control specific types of borrowing rather than
regulating directly the objectionable activities with which the borrowing
may at times be associated. Moreover, borrowing restrictions may be
difficult to enforce.14 The discussion that follows focuses, therefore, on
proposals to bring the general treatment of debt and equity into balance.
Traditionally, analysts have considered integrating the corporate
and individual income taxes, converting the corporate tax into a with-
holding mechanism for the individual income tax. Full integration has
never been adopted, but partial integration schemes to alleviate the
double taxation of dividends have been implemented in several coun-
tries.
Beyond full and partial integration schemes, two alternative pro-
posals have received considerable attention in recent years, the corpo-
rate cash flow tax and the proposal for limited dividend relief of the
American Law Institute. Each of these proposals has a particular
advantage over integration schemes in limiting windfalls to owners of
existing equity, but each would also introduce new problems. This
section of the paper reviews and compares the effects of corporate tax
integration and the newer approaches to corporate tax reform.
Integration
Under full integration, investors would be taxed on a partnership
basis. The single, individual tax on equity income would eliminate the
importance of the debt-equity distinction; all corporate-source income
would be taxed at the individual’s tax rate.
Much of the opposition to full integration has been of a technical
nature (see McLure 1979), but other difficulties are also found. Because
it would subject all equity income to a single tax at the individual’s tax
rate, few question that an integrated tax system would produce wind-
falls for the owners of existing equity, for the prospective tax burden on
such equity would have been reduced. More disturbing, however, is the
prospect that such windfalls would bring with them little positive
contribution to the incentive to invest.
Already discussed above is the argument that taxes on distributions
from existing equity are capitalized into the value of shares and do not
influence the marginal cost of capital for reinvested funds. This would
mean a current effective rate of tax of 34 percent on reinvested equity
funds, plus the effective rate of capital gains tax on accumulated
14 See Auerbach (1988) for a general discussion. In the particular context of takeovers,
see Bulow, Summers and Summers (1989).152 Alan ]. Auerbach
earnings, compared to the 28 percent or 33 percent tax rate that most
investors would face under an integrated tax system. Put simply,
investors would receive a small cut in their marginal tax rates and a large
windfall, equal to the present value of the capitalized taxes on distribu-
tions forgiven. This would include distributions from all net assets,
equal to returns to existing capital plus economic rents less interest
payments on preexisting debt.
Because taxation would be only at the investor level, an integrated
tax system would cease to tax foreign and tax-exempt shareholders at all
on their corporate-source income, treating equity income the way that
interest income is now treated. This would increase the relative incen-
tives for foreigners and tax-exempts to hold equity.
Dividend Relief
Dividend relief is much more easily implemented than full ,integra-
tion, for it requires the measurement only of dividends, rather than all
earnings. Given the traditional view that the serious problem of corpo-
rate double taxation applies primarily to earnings distributed as divi-
dends, dividend relief has been seen as an acceptable solution to the
distortions of the corporate tax.
The two basic approaches to dividend relief differ with respect to
whether the corporation or the shareholder receives the tax rebate.
Relief at the corporate level comes in the form of a full or partial
deduction for dividends paid, often expressed in terms of a lower tax
rate on distributed earnings, or a split-rate tax system.
In practice, split-rate systems have typically allowed only partial
deduction for dividends. In Germany, for example, the split-rate system
in the 1980s had rates of 56 percent and 36 percent on retentions and
distributions (King and Fullerton 1984). In Japan, the rates are currently
42 percent and 32 percent (Japanese Ministry of Finance 1988).
The shareholder-level alternative to the split-rate system is known
as the imputation system, since in calculating their income shareholders
add to the dividends they actually receive additional imputed income
equal to some or all of the taxes the corporations are assumed to have
paid on the earnings distributed. The shareholders are then given credit
for these imputed taxes in calculating their own income, in exactly the
way that taxes withheld by employers on wage and salary income are
included by employees in their taxable income but also are creditable
against their tax liability. In the United Kingdom, for example, the
imputation system permits a credit at the basic individual tax rate, so
that most taxable investors neither owe additional tax nor receive a
refund for excess taxes withheld (King and Fullerton 1984).
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possible under an imputation system, according to the fraction of
corporate taxes imputed. In general, the two systems are equivalent in
the case of taxable dividend recipients. The main difference is in the
treatment of foreign and tax-exempt shareholders. Since the imputation
system allows a credit for corporate taxes only against a shareholder’s
tax liability, those paying no taxes would receive no credit. Hence, one
may view an imputation system as being equivalent to a split-rate
system plus a withholding tax at the normal corporate tax rate on
dividends distributed to low or zero-bracket shareholders.
Like full integration, dividend relief suffers from the major draw-
back that it is provided at the very least for all dividends paid to taxable
investors, including dividends from existing equity for which there may
be very little change in the incentive to reinvest funds. Since the relief
would focus on dividends (and, as discussed next, firms will have the
incentive to make dividends the main form of distributions), one may
view either proposal as being equivalent simply to lowering the tax on
distributions directly at the shareholder level. To the extent that the
marginal source of equity funds is retained earnings, this would not
change the effective tax rate on equity-financed investments at all. Given
the revenue cost of dividend relief, this lack of marginal impact is a
serious drawback.15
An additional effect of both dividend relief and full integration
would be that, with dividends relieved of double taxation, firms would
have no tax incentive to repurchase shares instead. It should be stressed
again, however, that the removal of the incentive to repurchase shares
rather than pay dividends should have little effect on the incentive to
replace existing equity with debt.
The American Law Institute Proposal
In 1982, the American Law Institute published a volume consider-
ing the reform of the U.S. corporate income tax that included proposals
by the project’s reporter, William Andrews, to provide dividend relief in
a manner that would avoid the windfalls common to the schemes
discussed above. The Institute/Andrews scheme is fairly elaborate in its
detail, and has gone through several draft versions, the most recent
published in June 1989. To understand this plan and its effects, it is
is Up-to-date revenue estimates for full and partial integration schemes are hard to
obtain. However, the 1984 Treasury proposal for a 50 percent dividends-paid deduction
estimated a total (corporate and individual) revenue cost of $31 billion for fiscal year 1990
(the last year for which projections were provided).154 Alan J. Auerbach
useful to consider first a much simpler one that shares many of its
important characteristics.
The basic problem the American Law Institute plan seeks to attack
is that dividend relief is a windfall for equity funds already within the
corporate solution. A direct attack on this problem would be to couple a
dividends-paid deduction with a tax at the corporate rate on the present
value of deductions attributable to dividends paid from existing equity.
One would not need to keep track of these dividends. Since dividends
are normally taxable to recipients to the extent that they are paid out of
a firm’s accumulated earnings and profits, the stock of these earnings
and profits would serve as an appropriate tax base. The incentive effects
would be the same as under a dividends-paid deduction alone, but the
revenue effects would be quite different. Even if the windfalls tax were
made payable over several years, its revenue could well exceed that lost
from the dividends-paid deduction for many years (though not in the
long run).
The idea of taxing windfalls is not new. However, proposals to
recoup windfalls through explicit taxes have commonly been opposed as
being retroactive and unfair, even when they may only partially offset
windfall gains delivered implicitly at the same time.16 The American
Law Institute approach achieves such a tax on windfalls, but does so
implicitly, in effect making the payment of the windfalls tax (the "toll
charge") and qualification for dividend relief a decision of the firm,
allowing each firm the option of not qualifying for dividend relief and
not paying a windfalls tax.
Despite its many incarnations and sophisticated analysis, the Insti-
tute’s plan has retained its basic thrust and purpose of providing
dividend relief limited to newly contributed equity. It has two major
components. The first would provide limited dividend relief along the
lines of the dividends-paid deduction. The second would restrict the
ability of firms to make tax-favored nondividend distributions of funds
not qualifying for dividend relief.
The plan would distinguish between "old" and "new" equity, with
shares issued after its enactment being "new" and qualifying for special
treatment under the plan’s first component, a deduction for dividends
paid. The allowable deduction would be calculated by multiplying the
value of funds raised from the sale of new shares by some reasonable
rate of return. For example, if the plan became effective on January 1,
16 This was the case, for example, for an element of the President’s Tax Proposals of
May 1985, which would have recouped from corporations the tax reduction due to the
corporate rate cut on that component of taxable income arising from previous accelerated
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1990 and the allowable rate of deduction were 5 percent, a firm issuing
$1 million of equity after this date would be entitled to deduct up to
$50,000 of dividends annually thereafter. If the firm issued more equity
subsequently, its allowable dividend deductions would increase.
Like the other forms of dividend relief discussed above, this part of
the American Law Institute plan would alleviate the double taxation
facing newly contributed equity capital; for such equity, the plan would
be essentially identical to a dividends-paid deduction. This first compo-
nent of the plan, providing dividend relief for newly contributed equity,
is neither problematic nor controversial. It simply does for a certain class
of shares what standard dividend relief would do for all. It is the second
provision, which aims to curtail nondividend distributions, that has
caused controversy (see, for example, Jensen 1989).
The tax on nondividend distributions would apply to shares repur-
chased by a corporation itself as well as shares redeemed by another via
a cash acquisition. It is intended to offset the current tax advantage such
distributions enjoy, attributable to the basis that shareholders may
deduct from capital gains tax liability (and, before 1987, the lower rate at
which such capital gains were taxed). Under the original 1982 American
Law Institute plan, this tax would have been an excise tax on the
distributions themselves, added to the individual income tax burden.
The 1989 version includes instead a corporate-level minimum tax on
nondividend distributions at the tax rate of most high-income individual
investors (28 percent), creditable against individual tax liability on the
distributions. In either case, low-bracket investors would actually face a
higher tax burden on nondividend distributions than on ordinary
dividends, while the burdens would be similar for high-bracket inves-
tors.
Why is the tax on alternative distributions seen as necessary by its
supporters, and why is it opposed by others? The relevant question here
is what the appropriate benchmark is. The American Law Institute plan
takes the view that dividends are the normal form of distribution and
that taxes on such distributions are also normal. From this perspective,
the recent reduction in taxes through increased nondividend distribu-
tions represents an unintended windfall to which shareholders are not
entitled. Further, if firms see the nondividend option as unlikely to
continue indefinitely into the future, the new opportunity to convert old
equity into new equity qualifying for the plan’s dividend deduction will
spur further nondividend distributions unless the tax on alternative
distributions is also instituted. Others, taking the current situation as
the normal state of affairs, would view the tightening of rules on
nondividend distributions as unfair.
Because the first of the American Law Institute plan’s provisions
would reduce taxes and the second would increase them, it is natural156 Alan J. Auerbach
that the two parts are viewed with different degrees of enthusiasm by
those who would be affected by the plan. Together, the provisions may
be seen as providing dividend relief for new equity while eliminating all
windfalls from existing equity relative to the full taxation of all distributions.
The analysis of the American Law Institute plan to this point has
been based on a permanent, unannounced enactment of the plan.
However, in a world of uncertain and temporary tax policy, a change in
the tax on distributions could do more than change the value of taxes
capitalized in equity values. Unlike a direct windfalls tax, the plan’s toll
charge, consisting of taxes on dividend and nondividend distributions
from existing equity, would be paid only upon the distribution of these
funds. Given a constant tax system, this distinction would be irrelevant;
that is what makes the analogy to the windfalls tax useful. But given the
option to delay distributions, the possibility of distorted behavior is very
real under the plan.
If, for example, investors expected the tax on alternative distribu-
tions to be temporary, the incentive to delay share repurchases and
cash-financed takeovers could be significant. In fact, if a phase-in to full
dividend deductibility for old and new equity alike were anticipated,
even current dividends would be discouraged. Only a convincing,
permanent adoption of the American Law Institute plan would avoid
these incentives, and consistency of this policy over time would require
the system maintaining the distinction between old and new equity to
be permanent. Likewise, anticipation that the plan would be enacted
would increase nondividend distributions and reduce equity issues.
Even if the enactment came entirely as a surprise, there would still be
the inevitable question of fairness in transition: for example, how to treat
the company that made a large equity issue a day before the provision
of relief for new equity took effect.
The Cash-Flow Corporate Tax
Direct taxes on individual consumption or cash flow have enjoyed
considerable intellectual support in recent years (for example, Andrews
1974; Bradford 1980). Such a tax base would identify a household’s
consumption indirectly, using the identity that income is exhausted by
saving, taxes, and consumption, by allowing a deduction for saving
from the income tax base. Although corporations do not consume, a
cash-flow tax base for the corporation has its attractions, too. Like the
individual consumption tax, it would not alter the net return to saving.
The literature has noted the attractiveness of a corporate cash-flow
tax as part of a system of consumption taxation (Institute for Fiscal
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has, more recently, been proposed as a freestanding reform of the
corporate tax (Feldstein 1989).
The two basic approaches to corporate cash-flow taxation are
referred to by the Meade Committee (Institute for Fiscal Studies 1978) as
the R(eal) versus the R(eal)+F(inancial) bases. The two approaches differ
with respect to their treatment of borrowing and interest payments.
While the R-base would eliminate interest deductions (and not tax the
corporation’s interest income), the R+F-base would preserve such
deductions (and taxes) but add borrowing to (and deduct lending from)
the tax base. Perhaps the most significant difference between the two
approaches would be in their treatment of financial intermediaries,
whose profits, interest receipts less interest payments, would be tax
exempt under the R-base. For nonfinancial corporations, the approaches
would have similar effects, although the timing of tax payments by firms
could be quite different.
To convert the present corporate income tax to a cash-flow tax, one
would replace depreciation deductions with an immediate deduction for
all new investment and, under the R+F-base, include all net borrowing
in the tax base. The resulting tax base would be the firm’s receipts less
expenditures, that is, its net cash flow. This cash flow is the sum of all
the firm’s current distributions to its shareholders, including dividends
plus share repurchases. Given the previous discussion of the effects of
taxes on distributions, one can see immediately that the cash-flow tax is
nondistortionary: although it affects the value of the corporation, it
imposes no additional tax on the return to earnings that are reinvested.
Moreover, unlike other taxes on distributions (such as the dividend tax)
it does not discriminate against newly contributed equity, since it is a tax
on distributions net of new equity issues. New equity would not face a
net tax, in present value, on its distributions, receiving an offsetting
deduction upon its initial contribution. Thus, a move to the R+F-base
would be equivalent to replacing the current corporate tax with a tax on
all distributions from existing equity. In terms of marginal incentives,
this outcome would be equivalent to the abolition of the corporate tax.
A similar analysis applies for the R-base, which has been discussed
more frequently as a possible tax reform. By eliminating the deduction
for interest payments instead of taxing net borrowing, the R-base would
add net distributions to holders of existing debt (interest payments less
net borrowing) to those already taxed under the R+F-base. Again, there
would be no marginal impact of the corporate tax.
In comparing the impact of the cash-flow tax to the approaches
previously considered, one may identify three significant differences:
(1) Unique among the proposals, the cash-flow tax would raise the
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(2) Unique among the proposals, the cash-flow tax would cause the
tax system as a whole to favor equity over debt;
(3) Like the American Law Institute proposal, but unlike the other
schemes, the cash-flow tax would avoid giving windfalls to
existing equity.
Under the current income tax, the effective corporate tax rate on
equity-financed investments is close to the statutory tax rate of 34
percent (Auerbach 1987). However, owing to the full deductibility of
nominal interest payments, the effective corporate tax rate on debt-
financed investment is negative: marginal debt-financed investments
will generate negative corporate tax liabilities, since more than the real
cost of funds is deductible. Hence, a move to the cash-flow tax will, by
setting both effective tax rates to zero, raise the tax burden on debt and
lower the burden on equity. This demonstrates the first proposition in
the above list.
The second proposition given above also follows immediately.
While the corporate-level marginal tax rates on debt and equity would be
the same under a corporate cash-flow tax, the overall tax rates would not
be, since even under current law the treatment of capital gains is favored
relative to ordinary interest income. The individual tax advantage to
equity, combined with the neutral corporate treatment of debt and
equity, would tip the balance toward equity. Depending on the contri-
bution of the dividend tax to the effective individual equity tax rate, this
gap could be considerable. The treatment of equity under the cash-flow
tax would be more favorable than under a dividend relief scheme, since
there is no tax on retained earnings. The treatment of debt is less
favorable, since only the cash-flow tax would eliminate the negative
corporate tax on debt-financed investment.17
Finally, like the American Law Institute proposal, the cash-flow tax
would avoid windfalls. Whereas a deduction for all dividends paid, for
17 In favoring corporate equity over debt, the corporate cash-flow tax might also favor
corporate equity over noncorporate investment, which is currently taxed once, to the
income recipient, like corporate debt. The answer would depend on how the tax reform
would affect noncorporate business, an issue typically ignored in recent policy discus-
sions.
If the noncorporate sector were covered by the new provisions (immediate write-off of
assets plus the elimination of interest deductions), then all business borrowing would be
equally discouraged relative to equity, and the current relative treatment of corporate and
noncorporate equity would be maintained. If, however, there were no change in the
treatment of noncorporate equity and debt, this would make noncorporate debt more
attractive than corporate debt, and noncorporate equity potentially less attractive than
corporate equity, leading to a divergence in the financial incentives at corporate and
noncorporate levels.
This issue would clearly require more thought were the corporate cash-flow tax to be
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example, would eliminate the corporate-level tax on all distributed
income, including the corporation’s pure economic rents and the returns
to its existing capital, the cash-flow tax would not do so. If, during the
transition period, it preserved the tax treatment of preexisting assets and
liabilities by maintaining depreciation allowances for existing assets,
allowing existing inventories to be deducted when used and (under an
R-base) continuing the interest deductions of existing debt, the cash-
flow tax would not alter the tax treatment of distributions from existing
equity at all. It would be equivalent at the margin to the abolition of the
corporate income tax but would avoid the windfalls. Like the American
Law Institute proposal, its only effect would be at the margin. However,
unlike that proposal, it would raise the effective marginal tax rate on
debt-financed projects and would reduce the tax burden on all equity-
financed projects, including those financed by existing equity.
The corporate cash-flow tax would, again like the American Law
Institute plan, present serious transition problems. Even with a preser-
vation of the tax treatment of existing assets and debt, firms would have
a strong incentive to wait to invest if the adoption of a cash-flow tax
were anticipated, for the immediate write-off of investment would be
received only for new investment. In general, attempts to limit windfalls
by distinguishing new from old activity may be subject to similar
problems.
Recent estimates for the United States have found that a switch to
corporate cash-flow taxation would broaden the corporate tax base,
either raising revenue or permitting a reduction in the corporate tax rate
without a revenue loss. For the period 1981-83, Aaron and Galper (1985)
estimated that a tax rate of only 33 percent, rather than the then-
prevailing rate of 46 percent, would have been necessary were a
cash-flow tax base adopted. Gordon and Slemrod (1988) estimated that
a switch to coiporate cash-flow taxation would have increased tax
revenues from nonfinancial corporations by $20.8 billion in 1983. How-
ever, for two reasons, these results likely overstate the positive revenue
impact of adoption today.
First, both estimates are based on the pre-1986 period when
depreciation allowances were accelerated and the investment tax credit
applied. Thus, the immediate write-off of assets provided by cash-flow
taxation would, in itself, have represented a smaller tax reduction than
under current law. Moreover, both of the reported estimates are for the
long run, and do not properly account for transition-period revenue
losses. Based on information provided by Gordon and Slemrod (1988) in
their own analysis, Auerbach (1989) found that maintaining deprecia-
tion allowances on existing corporate assets and interest deductions on
the existing stock of corporate debt would have reduced the revenue
gain of a switch to cash-flow taxation from the initial estimate of $20.8160 Alan J. Auerbach
billion to just under $7 billion. However, starting from the post-1986 tax
system, with its reduced investment incentives, the same policy would
likely lose revenue and reduce marginal tax rates overall. The revenue
loss., cannot be avoided unless less generous transition provisions are
introduced or the corporate tax rate is increased.
The corporate cash-flow tax, like the American Law Institute plan,
provides its equity incentives through tax reductions at the corporate
level. Therefore, unlike an imputation system, it would extend the
benefits of equity relief to foreign equity owners. However, just as a
withholding tax could be used to convert the split-rate system into an
imputation system, one could couple the cash-flow tax with a withhold-
ing tax on equity distributions to foreigners and nontaxable entities.
Such a withholding tax was included in the corporate cash-flow tax
considered by Aaron and Galper (1985).
Conclusions
The most significant problem one confronts in deciding whether
and how to reform the tax treatment of corporate debt and equity is that
the impact of taxation on corporate financial policy is poorly under-
stood. Little evidence supports the view that changes in the tax
environment have spurred the borrowing boom of the past few years.
While the tax advantages of debt have increased for some equity-
holders, they have decreased for others. The increased incidence of tax
losses has contributed further to a decline in the value of interest
deductions overall.
The rise in equity retirements appears to be associated with conver-
sions of equity into debt much more than a reduction in dividends; the
dividend puzzle remains largely intact. However, the ability to redeem
equity without incurring the tax cost of dividends does little to explain
why the redemptions have occurred, since such favorable tax treatment
would also have been available to future distributions from equity.
Given this uncertainty, one should tread carefully toward signifi-
cant changes in corporate taxation. Rationalizing the treatment of debt
and equity is in general a sufficiently desirable objective that it should be
considered, even if recent changes in financial policy are not tax-driven.
However, available alternatives all have their drawbacks, offering either
revenue-losing windfalls or new complications and distortions. These
costs must be measured against the costs of maintaining the current
system, difficult as they are to estimate.TAX POLICY AND CORPORATE BORROWING 161
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David F. Bradford*
As usual, Alan Auerbach has given us a very nice paper, one that
includes some elegant and underplayed formal touches about the effect
of taxes when general equilibrium portfolio effects are taken into
account. In my brief time I am not going to linger on those refinements,
but instead will emphasize some of the economic analytical problems
that he has highlighted. Most of these problems or puzzles are familiar
to tax specialists, but may not yet be sufficiently appreciated by the
wider community interested in corporate tax policy.
Corporate Tax Puzzles
The challenge to economic analysis is nowhere clearer than in the
case of the dividend paradox to which Auerbach refers, and I would like
to work through it in a bit more detail to emphasize its nature. The broad
question is, why do corporations pay dividends. But it is not, as often
posed more specifically, why do corporations not retain more earnings.
Instead it is, why, given a desire to make a distribution to shareholders,
corporations use dividends, as the term is defined in the tax law, rather
than an alternative form of distribution that is more favorably taxed. The
alternative form on which I would like to focus is the use of corporate
funds to purchase its own equity shares. Table 1 lays out the conse-
quences of distributing $1 of funds from a corporation to a shareholder
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Table 1
Effect of Alternative Routes of $1 Distribution to Shareholders
Stock
Dividend Repurchase
Corporation Bank Account -1 -1
Corporation Memo: E & P Account -1
Shareholder Bank Account 1 -m 1 -g(1 -b)
Shareholder Stock Value -s -s-e
Shareholder Memo: Basis -b
m = Shareholder’s marginal tax rate on ordinary income,
g = Shareholder’s marginal capital gains tax rate.
b = Shareholder’s basis in $1 worth of the stock,
s = Ex-dividend effect (market value of $1 in corporation bank account).
e = Market’s valuation of $1 in earnings and profits (E & P) account.
alternatively in the form of a dividend or in the form of a repurchase of
$1 worth of the company’s stock from the shareholder.
The effect of both transactions is almost the same at the company
level. The difference is in the tax-technical detail of the treatment of the
company’s accumulated "E & P" (earnings and profits) account. When
the E & P account is exhausted, a dividend-style distribution is treated
by the shareholder as a "return of capital," giving rise to a reduction in
the shareholder’s tax "basis" in the shares (roughly, the purchase cost of
the shares, less any previous return of capital) and no current share-
holder income tax. 1 In principle, therefore, a smaller earnings and profit
account is a good thing, a small plus for the dividend form of distribu-
tion.
A noncorporate shareholder with marginal tax rate m nets $(1-m)
from a $1 dividend and suffers a loss of $s in the value of his or her
holding, the ex-dividend effect on the stock’s price, a result of reducing
the corporation’s bank balance by $1. If, instead, the shareholder
absorbs the $1 distribution via a sale of some of the stock, the net cash
realized is reduced, not by the ordinary income tax rate, but by the
capital gains tax. The latter is the capital gains rate times the difference
between $1 and the shareholder’s tax basis in the shares sold, denoted
b in the table. Generally, b is greater than zero, and furthermore it used
to be the case that the capital gains tax rate was substantially less than
the ordinary income tax rate. There is a price to the shareholder, though,
for this tax advantage, namely, the using up of some basis, which
~ If the shareholder’s basis is zero, then a "return of capital" is taxed in the same way
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implies a possible increase in tax at some time in the future (unless the
share is held until the owner’s death). Because the thing the sharehold-
ers as a group continue to own after the distribution is almost the same,
whether the cash flows out by dividend or by share repurchase, the "ex
dividend" effect of the share repurchase should also be the same,
namely $s. The tiny difference is in the decrement to the corporate
E & P account associated with the dividend, and not with the share
repurchase, shown in the table as an extra decrement of $e to share-
holder wealth under the latter route.
In the typical case we can probably safely assume that the value of
e is negligible because most large public corporations can expect never to
reach the stage of exhausting their E & P accounts (and for that reason
many have no reason to know and do not know their accumulated
E & P). In many cases it is also reasonable to neglect the shareholder’s
basis reduction associated with share repurchase. Under these circum-
stances the advantage of the repurchase route over the dividend route
is: 1-g(1-b) - (l-m), or m - g(1-b). In the good old days, the
marginal tax rate on ordinary income for a well-to-do shareholder was 50
percent; the marginal rate on capital gains was 40 percent of that on
ordinary income: g = .4m. The basis in $1 worth of stock might
commonly be fifty cents: b = .5. These figures imply that in the good old
days the net advantage of the repurchase route was $0.42 per dollar
distributed! For an average marginal tax rate of 0.2 instead of 0.5, the net
advantage per dollar was still $0.17. When one considers that the
economic effect of the two routes is identical, $0.42 or even $0.17 per
dollar was a very substantial penalty to pay for using the traditional
dividend method. Yet corporate dividends were, and still are, very
substantial. That is the dividend paradox.
The point of this close exploration of the tax advantages of share
repurchase over dividends as a method of distributing funds out of
corporations is twofold: On the one hand, it illustrates the weakness of
wealth-maximizing as a hypothesis upon which to base predictions of
the effect of tax policy in the short run. On the other hand, corporate
owners do appear to have slowly begun to adapt their actual policies to
those that economics suggests are financially dominant. But the change
is not by any means complete. Furthermore, by eliminating the rate
differential between ordinary income and capital gains, the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 sharply reduced (although it did not eliminate) the relative
advantage of share repurchase. The lesson may be that the economic
analysis does give good predictions over a long enough horizon, but
that behavior will adjust slowly and with considerable inertia.
On the face of it, the tax changes in 1986 not only greatly reduced
the incentive to use share repurchase (or cash acquisition of one
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way of avoiding dividend tax), they shifted the incentives in favor of
debt over equity finance when the matter is viewed from the perspective
of the well-to-do individual. Over a period of a decade or so, the
marginal tax rate on interest received by such individuals fell from 70
percent to 28 percent, while the tax on equity return in the form of
retained earnings dropped from 46 percent plus capital gains tax accrual
of, say, 8 percent to 34 percent plus capital gains tax accrual of, perhaps,
9 percent. From an earlier comparison of 70 percent tax on interest and
54 percent on equity, the recent comparison is between 28 percent on
interest and 43 percent on equity. As Auerbach points out, tax-exempt
entities also hold significant amounts of equity; for them the rate
differential has moved in the opposite direction. Interest receipts were
and are taxed at 0 percent, whereas the rate of tax on equity has dropped
from 46 to 34 percent.
Both of these are partial pictures, however, and neglect the role of
inflation. Consider as an example of a corporate asset a machine that
costs $100 and yields $5 per year in perpetuity. A corporation could
borrow at 5 percent interest to buy such a machine and break even, with
or without an income tax. By contrast, if it bought the machine outright
and retained the earnings it would generate a yield of (1-t)5 percent,
where t is the corporate tax rate and the individual shareholder level tax
on capital gains is ignored. High-bracket individuals, with marginal
rates above the corporate rate, would prefer equity to debt. Now
introduce inflation at 10 percent per annum. Assuming (heroically)
inflation-adjusted depreciation, the corporation’s asset would continue
to yield 5 percent in real terms before tax, (1-t)5 percent real after
corporate tax. But the return on debt will now depend on the adjust-
ment of the nominal interest rate. If it adjusts point for point with
inflation (thus maintaining constancy in real terms exclusive of tax
effects), interest will go to 15 percent. The real interest rate for a
high-bracket taxpayer is now sharply negative (15 percent, less, say, 7.5
percent tax, less 10 percent inflation), and there is a strong incentive for
high-bracket taxpayers to borrow. Indeed, there is money to be made by
borrowing to buy equity, even if the real return from equity is also hurt
by inflation (owing to inadequate correction of depreciation allowances).
Once again, we have a story with incompletely worked out equilibrium
implications, but it would seem that conditions of inflation would
induce a shift of equity from low- to high-bracket taxpayers and
probably a larger amount of equity overall. With the reduction of
inflation rates in the later 1980s one would expect downward pressure
on the stock of equity, and upward pressure on the stock of debt.
Since we do not know how equilibrium is determined we cannot be
confident about the windfall effects of a program of dividend relief,
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problem. Suppose both high-bracket individual and corporate tax rates
are 30 percent and capital gains are not taxed (because of deferral until
death). Then, if the only way corporations can distribute to shareholders
is in the form of dividends, we can imagine an equilibrium in which
high-bracket individuals are indifferent between equity and debt and
zero-bracket individuals (read pension funds) hold only debt. The
equityholders are indifferent between "their" corporation’s distributing
an extra dollar in dividends and its retaining the dollar for distribution
a year hence, after earning the going rate of interest (say, 10 percent) less
corporate tax. This is because the dollar currently distributed yields the
shareholder $0.70. Saved in the bond market for one period, the $0.70
becomes $0.70 x (1 + .10 x (1 - .30)). Alternatively, the dollar retained
becomes $(1 + .10 x (1 - .30)) in the coffers of the corporation, which,
when distributed, becomes 0.70 x $(1 + .10 x (1 - .30)) in the hands of
the shareholders, after payment of dividend tax. The policies, "Distrib-
ute now" and "Retain and distribute next year," have the exactly the
same consequences for high-bracket taxpayers.
To render this outcome consistent with equilibrium in the market
for shares requires that the shares representing $1 inside the corporation
be valued at $0.70. The difference between the two values is the
dividend tax that has to be paid to get the money out of the corporation.
In this situation, eliminating the dividend tax through dividend relief,
while leaving the other taxes, would imply a jump in the value of shares
by 30/70, or 43 percent. But note that if, instead, the value of shares is
based upon the expectation that the funds can be gotten out of the
corporation by share repurchase, much less of a discount will be
predicted, and much less of a windfall effect of the shift to dividend
relief.
Among the approaches to rendering the tax system neutral with
respect to the financial structure of the corporate sector, the R-base
corporate cash flow tax is certainly the most radical that Auerbach
discusses. In my view, he understates the pressure that such a system
would create if it were not coordinated with parallel changes in the
individual income tax. Here, too, we have a structure of rules under
which the usual economic models of the determinants of corporate
investment and financial behavior have no equilibrium. The taxation of
corporate equity investment would be effected through the realization-
based capital gains tax only, while interest receipts would continue to be
overtaxed (by virtue of no inflation adjustment). The corporate sector
would become a vast tax shelter; high-bracket taxpayers would have
strong pressures to borrow to buy equity.
Let me conclude with a less radical suggestion than Auerbach’s for
moderating the potential windfall gains from introducing an imputation
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financial structure). The approach is suggested by Auerbach’s discus-
sion that relates the size of such gains to the amount of dividend tax that
would be avoided on, in effect, undistributed earnings accumulated
from the past. The trick would be to use the existing tax concept of
accumulated corporate earnings and profits (E & P) that is the opera-
tional counterpart to undistributed earnings accumulated from the past.
Under current rules, this tax account is incremented each year by that
year’s corporate E & P (which are more broadly defined than taxable
income) and decremented by dividends paid. The suggestion is simply
to discontinue the addition of earnings to a corporation’s E & P account,
and treat what we now call dividends (that is, payments out of
accumulated E & P) just as we do now. An imputation credit would
apply only for distributions that we would now call a return of capital.
Recognizing that such an approach would invite many refinements (for
example, to reduce a continuing incentive to postpone dividends by
making distributions to shareholders through share repurchase), it
would take advantage of familiar tax concepts and would probably
appear much less academic than a onetime windfall tax.
If these remarks and Auerbach’s paper give the impression of a
most uncomfortable state of knowledge about corporate income taxa-
tion, and about the taxation of capital income more broadly, I do not
think the reader is being misled. We live in a system in which the writers
of tax law seem to be driven by the requirements of staying ahead of the
ingenuity of financial technicians. In my view, approaches are available
to us to move toward logically consistent rules that are vastly simpler
than the evolving legal tangle that Auerbach analyzes. The key to a tax
system that might hold still is uniformity of the tax treatment of both
sides of what we think of as capital income transactions, including the
applicable tax rate. But, obviously, that would take the fun out of tax
analysis and would be the subject of another paper.Discussion
Emil M. Sunley*
Alan Auerbach has provided a comprehensive survey of a very
complex field. The first part of his paper focuses on the role tax factors
may have played in the recent surge in corporate borrowing. I agree
with his major conclusion that changes in tax incentives are not the
primary cause of the shift toward debt and that the social costs of
increased borrowing may have been overstated. One factor that may
have contributed to the increased corporate borrowing, not discussed by
Auerbach, is the development of a market for high-yield, low-grade
corporate bonds; that is, a market for so-called junk bonds. It is only in
recent years that large publicly traded corporations have learned that
they can issue low-grade subordinated debt.
A tax factor that may have contributed to the surge in corporate
borrowing is the expansion of the tax base as a result of the 1986 cutback
in tax preferences. For example, the repeal of the investment tax credit
permits companies to absorb more interest deductions.
What I want to focus on is the second part of Auerbach’s paper: the
review of alternative tax reform proposals to reduce the disparities in the
tax treatment of debt and equity.
Integration
One of the most significant trends in tax policy in recent years has
been the movement in national, tax structures from classical systems,
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with separate taxation of corporations and their shareholders, towards
some form of integration of corporate and shareholder taxation with
respect to distributed corporate profits. This trend has grown out of an
increasing concern over the impact of the double tax burden that the
classical system places on income from capital in the corporate sector.
The double taxation of corporate profits, once at the corporate level
and again at the shareholder level, creates three types of distortions that
reduce the efficiency of capital markets. First, the classical system
distorts the allocation of capital between the corporate and the noncor-
porate sectors. Second, it encourages corporations to retain their earn-
ings in order to avoid the double taxation of dividends. Third, it
encourages the use of debt finance because interest payments are
deductible for tax purposes and dividends are not. The integration of
individual and corporate taxes would reduce these distortions and
would thereby increase economic efficiency.
Although it is recognized that a movement towards corporate
integration would improve the allocation of capital, it is not clear that it
would increase the level of investment. The major concern is that
corporate integration would reduce the "tax" on distributions and
thereby encourage additional distributions, reducing business savings.
Unless savings of individuals increased, total savings would be reduced.
The United States has not adopted a form of dividend relief
primarily because business has offered very little support for such
proposals. Business opposition to integration is due to the fact that the
benefits of integration are spread very unevenly across industries and
across firms within an industry. Integration would provide little or no
benefit to small closely held companies, which currently pay little in
dividends. Integration would also not benefit rapidly growing or high
technology firms, which also pay little in dividends. The utility compa-
nies are concerned that integration, particularly the dividends-paid
deduction variety, would be treated for utility rate-making purposes as
a reduction in the corporate tax, resulting in the benefits of integration
being immediately passed through to customers. Large multinational
companies that pay substantial foreign taxes but little in U.S. taxes
would also not benefit from the proposals, since it is unlikely that the
Administration or the Congress would support an integration proposal
providing a credit at the shareholder level unless taxes had actually been
paid to the U.S. government at the corporate level. Finally, some
academics are concerned that dividend relief would provide an unwar-
ranted windfall for old capital.
The choice between the shareholder credit and a dividends-paid
deduction hinges on some subtle issues. The shareholder credit looks
like individual tax relief, while the dividends-paid deduction looks like
corporate relief. The two approaches can be made equivalent if the sameDISCUSSION 171
level of dividend relief is provided. If cash dividends are sticky in the
short run, the dividends-paid deduction increases corporate cash flow
and the shareholder credit increases the cash flow of the shareholders.
Also, it is easier to deny the relief to tax-exempt shareholders and
foreigners if the relief takes the form of a shareholder credit rather than
a dividends-paid deduction.
The American Law Institute proposal described by Auerbach deals
with the windfall problem by limiting dividend relief to new equity and
by restricting the ability of firms to make tax-favored non-dividend
distributions. One problem with this proposal is that Congress might
take the stick and not the carrot.
No country has adopted a system of full integration of the corporate
and individual taxes where the corporate income is imputed to the
shareholders whether it is distributed or not. Full integration, compared
to partial integration, would put less pressure on increased distributions
since the tax relief from the "double tax" is not triggered when
distributions are made. Compared to the classical system of taxing
corporations and individuals, however, full integration would increase
the pressure to pay out dividends since under the classical system,
dividends trigger the second tax.
As Auerbach points out in his paper, the technical problems of full
integration have not yet been fully worked out. I believe that most of the
complexity could be logged at the corporate level if the corporate tax is
retained as a withholding tax. Two particularly difficult areas in a full
integration proposal are the treatment of tiers of corporations and how
to handle companies with multiple classes of stock.
Cash Flow Tax
A corporate cash flow tax would also eliminate bias between debt
and equity. A movement to a corporate cash flow tax involves significant
transition problems. How should old investments be treated? How
should old debt be treated? There are no easy answers. If, for example,
companies are permitted to expense new investments while at the same
time continuing to write off old investments, the tax base will shrink
significantly. On the other hand, to go cold turkey and deny any further
write-offs on old investments would penalize companies that made very
large irregular investments just before the switch to the cash flow tax.
Blueprints suggested that the transition problem be handled by
requiring taxpayers, for a period of ten years, to compute their tax under
the old and new laws and pay the higher of the two computed taxes.
This approach avoids significant revenue loss during the transition, but172 Emil M. Sunley
the simplicity gains from a cash flow tax would be dissipated if the old
law is retained for ten years.
The international implications of introducing a cash flow tax also are
troublesome and have no easy solutions. If the United States adopts a
pure corporate cash flow tax, a significant amount of tax revenue would
be transferred from the United States to any home country that
continues to rely on income taxes. This problem was recognized by the
Meade Commission. The solution was to impose a special withholding
tax on dividends paid to foreigners. The purpose of this withholding tax
would be to soak up the allowable foreign tax credit in the home
country, so that no residual tax would have to be paid in the home
country. It is not at all clear whether the regular cash flow tax or the
special withholding tax would be creditable against the home country’s
income tax. The withholding tax would violate the nondiscrimination
provisions of existing tax treaties.
Conclusion
In 1986, Congress rejected any fundamental change in the way the
United States taxes corporations and shareholders. Since then, the wave
of corporate mergers and reorganizations and the surge in corporate
debt have rekindled interest in reducing or removing the bias against
corporate equity. Auerbach provides a very able survey of the issues
surrounding any fundamental change in the tax treatment of corpora-
tions and shareholders.
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